Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

2014

Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural
Communications in Canadian Religious Freedom
Litigation
Howard Kislowicz

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Recommended Citation
Kislowicz, Howard, "Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural Communications in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation" (2014).
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 39.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/39

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
Research Paper No. 35
Vol. 10/ Issue. 09/ (2014)

Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural
Communications in Canadian Religious Freedom
Litigation
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 52(1), Forthcoming 2014.

Howard Kislowicz

Editors:
Editor-in-Chief: Carys J. Craig (Associate Dean of Research & Institutional Relations and
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto)
Production Editor: James Singh (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto)

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2450077

Further Information and a collection of publications about Osgoode Hall Law School Legal
Studies Research Paper Series can be found at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=722488

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 35
Vol. 10/ Issue. 09/ (2014)

Faithful Translations? Cross-Cultural Communications in Canadian Religious
Freedom Litigation
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 52(1), Forthcoming 2014.
Howard Kislowicz
Abstract:
In three religious freedom cases pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada – Amselem,
Multani, and Huterrian Brethren of Wilson Colony – religious freedom claimants engaged in
litigation over a religious practice particular to their group. Some have argued that cases like
these can be seen as cross-cultural encounters. How did the religious freedom claimants
seek to make their practices – the succah, the kirpan, and the prohibition on being
photographed– understood to the courts? And how did the courts respond to these claims?
In this paper, I draw out two central values from the literature on cross-cultural
communication: respect and self-awareness. I then use these values as lenses through which
to view participant narratives collected in a qualitative study of litigants, lawyers, and an
expert witness. I argue that courts are more likely to achieve a fuller understanding of
minority religious practices when they are faithful to the values of respect and selfawareness. This, in turn, can strengthen their proportionality analyses. Of the three cases,
the Supreme Court in Multani came the closest to realizing this ideal. The majority in Wilson
Colony marked a low point in this regard, failing to fully appreciate the litigants’ commitment
to their collectivist worldview. Amselem was something of a middle ground, where the Court
deliberately preferred to engage with a thinner account of the religious practice.
Keywords:
Freedom of Religion -- Cross-cultural communication -- Multiculturalism -- Accommodation -Litigation
Author(s):
Howard Kislowicz
Faculty of Law
University of New Brunswick
E: hkislowi@unb.ca

Faithful Translations?
Cross-Cultural Communication in Canadian Religious
Freedom Litigation
Submitted to the Osgoode Hall Law Journal on 25 October 2013

Howard Kislowicz
Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick
Howard Kislowicz is an assistant professor at the University of New Brunswick’s Faculty of
Law. He teaches Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Multiculturalism and the Law. He
was previously a lecturer in constitutional law for the accreditation exam preparatory programs
at both the University of Toronto and Osgoode Hall.
After completing his common law and civil law degrees at McGill University, he served as clerk
to Justice Gilles Létourneau at Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal. He went on to practice at a
national law firm in Toronto. He then returned to the study of law, completing his LLM and SJD
at the University of Toronto. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Alan Marks
Medal for best thesis in the University of Toronto’s graduate law program, and the SSHRC
Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship. He has presented at national and
international conferences including the Harvard-Stanford International Junior Faculty Forum and
the Berlin Roundtables on Transnationality. His research interests include religious freedom,
multiculturalism, constitutional law, and administrative law.
Abstract:
In three religious freedom cases pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada – Amselem, Multani,
and Huterrian Brethren of Wilson Colony – religious freedom claimants engaged in litigation
over a religious practice particular to their group. Some have argued that cases like these can be
seen as cross-cultural encounters. How did the religious freedom claimants seek to make their
practices – the succah, the kirpan, and the prohibition on being photographed– understood to the
courts? And how did the courts respond to these claims? In this paper, I draw out two central
values from the literature on cross-cultural communication: respect and self-awareness. I then
use these values as lenses through which to view participant narratives collected in a qualitative
study of litigants, lawyers, and an expert witness. I argue that courts are more likely to achieve a
fuller understanding of minority religious practices when they are faithful to the values of respect
and self-awareness. This, in turn, can strengthen their proportionality analyses. Of the three
cases, the Supreme Court in Multani came the closest to realizing this ideal. The majority in
Wilson Colony marked a low point in this regard, failing to fully appreciate the litigants’
commitment to their collectivist worldview. Amselem was something of a middle ground, where
the Court deliberately preferred to engage with a thinner account of the religious practice.
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1. Introduction
It is autumn in Montreal, and the Jewish festival of Succoth is about to begin. In
celebration, three Orthodox Jewish families in an upscale condominium complex have installed
succoth (singular: succah) on their balconies, temporary huts with leafy coverings where they

*

I owe an enormous debt to Ayelet Shachar for her comments and guidance in the supervision of the doctoral
project on which this paper is based. I am very grateful to Ping-Chun Hsiung and Jean-François GaudreaultDesbiens for their wisdom and comments on earlier drafts. Many thanks go to the participants in the 2013 HarvardStanford International Junior Faculty Forum for their insights, in particular to Helen Irving and Deborah Hensler for
their helpful commentary. Thanks also to Benjamin Berger and Yasmin Dawood for their critical insights and
suggestions, and to Gail Henderson, Nicole O’Byrne, Zoë Sinel, and Hilary Young for helpful comments. Thanks to
Matthew Reinhart for his able editorial assistance, and to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. I
thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the funding that allowed me to complete
this project. As always, special thanks to Dr. Naomi Lear and Gabriel Kislowicz. Mistakes are mine.
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will take their meals for the duration of the eight-day holiday. Other co-owners are upset; the
huts are in direct contravention of the complex’s bylaws, which prohibit the installation of
anything on balconies. The condo board commences injunction proceedings. The matter
proceeds to the Supreme Court of Canada, where a narrowly divided Court favours the
arguments of the Orthodox Jewish families, granting that the bylaws could not infringe their
religious freedom.1
Another autumn in a suburb of Montreal, some years later, a high school student, having
recently immigrated to Canada from India, is walking up the stairs to his classroom. His kirpan,
an article of faith in the form of a dagger carried by many baptized Sikhs, accidentally drops
from his clothing. After being called to the principal’s office, the student’s family reaches a
compromise with the school principal whereby the kirpan would be secured tightly under his
clothing at all times. The school’s governing board, unhappy with the compromise, informs the
student that he may not bring his kirpan to school. The student’s family initiates litigation and is
ultimately successful before a unanimous Supreme Court.2
More years later, summertime in Alberta, a Hutterite farmer is pulled over for speeding. The
police officer notes that the farmer’s licence is expired and bears no photograph. Alberta had
recently made driver’s licence photos universally mandatory, eliminating a longstanding
religious exemption. The farmer is given a ticket. He and his community initiate proceedings
challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory photo, claiming their religious obligations
prohibit them from having their photos taken. Though they have success in the lower courts, a

1
2

Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 [Amselem].
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6 [Multani].
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narrowly divided Supreme Court holds in favour of the province, ruling that the mandatory photo
requirement is constitutional.3
These are the basic narratives of three landmark religious freedom cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada in the last two decades. They have generated much interest and
scholarly commentary. This paper returns to these cases to examine in detail the way the litigants
and their counsel told their stories and the way these stories were received by courts and
opposing counsel. I analyze these exchanges as episodes of cross-cultural communication in
which members of religious cultural communities sought to make themselves understood to
participants in the Canadian legal culture.4 The primary aim of this paper is to develop a set of
criteria to evaluate the success of those moments of cross-cultural communication, and to apply
those criteria to episodes observed in the documentary records of the cases and in narratives told
by litigants, lawyers, and an expert witness. I argue that courts are more likely to achieve a fuller
understanding of minority religious practices when they are faithful to the values of respect and
self-awareness that emerge from the scholarship on cross-cultural communication.
This paper is based on an interdisciplinary project employing legal analysis and qualitative
sociological methods.5 It contributes to the developing empirical literature on religious freedom

3

Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Wilson Colony].
I recognize that the legal culture in Quebec is significantly different from that in the rest of Canada, explained in
part by its civil law tradition and identification as a distinct, French-speaking society: see Sébastien Grammond,
"Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et de la religion: convergence ou conflit?" (2009)
43 RJT 83. My aim here is to capture the moments of communication between a religious culture and a state legal
culture; that all the cases were pursued to the Supreme Court of Canada adds a common element that justifies a
comparison amonfst the three cases. Thanks to Nicole O’Byrne for raising this point.
5
The project was the basis of my doctoral dissertation, successfully defended at the University of Toronto’s Faculty
of Law in December 2012. The dissertation supervision committee was Ayelet Shachar (chair, Law and Political
Science, Toronto), Ping-Chun Hsiung (sociology, Toronto), and Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens (Law,
Université de Montréal). The defence committee also included Benjamin Berger (Osgoode Hall Law School),
Yasmin Dawood (Law, Toronto) and Ben Schlesinger (Social Work, Toronto) served as chair for the defence.
4
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in Canada.6 Unlike previous research, it centres on participant experiences of litigation and
compares results across multiple case studies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the project’s methods and explains
the rationale for case selection. Section 3 provides an overview of scholarship on cross-cultural
communication and distils two main values that cut across the literature: respect, and selfawareness. Section 4 considers the prospects for cross-cultural communication in courtroom
settings, paying particular attention to the unequal power relationships between state actors and
non-state actors. Section 5 represents this paper’s main contribution, providing a detailed
analysis of interview transcripts and court documents through the lenses developed in sections 3
and 4. Section 6 concludes by comparing the results across the three cases under review, which
had varying levels of success in terms of cross-cultural communication. It also develops the
argument that judges are more likely to have a full appreciation of the relevant facts when they
demonstrate the values of respect and self-awareness emphasized in the literature on crosscultural communication.
2. Methods
Qualitative inquiry, a methodology familiar to disciplines like anthropology and sociology, is
less common in legal scholarship.7 Qualitative methods employ inductive logic, allowing

6

Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 183; Shauna Van Praagh, “The Chutzpah of
Chasidism” 11 Can J L & Soc 193; Anne Saris & Jean-Mathieu Potvin, “Canadian Muslim Women and Resolution
of Family Conflicts: An Empirical Qualitative Study (2005-2007)” in Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori, eds, Law
and Religion in the 21st Century (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010) 337.
7
For an overview of the use of qualitative methods in legal scholarship, see Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches
to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal
Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 926. See also Eve Darian-Smith, ed, Ethnography and Law
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography
of Legal Discourse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An
Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). The Journal of Legal Pluralism and
Unofficial Law has also published ethnographic accounts of legal practices, particularly in post-colonial
environments.
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research concepts to emerge from the data rather than setting out to test a particular hypothesis.8
Typically, qualitative research is concerned with gathering and analyzing rich data not accessible
through quantitative methods such as surveys. By focusing on the subtle processes of
interpretation at play in a particular social setting, a qualitative approach provides an ideal way to
study the individualized experiences of participants in court processes surrounding religious
freedom.
The primary sources for this project are in-depth interviews. I interviewed 10 participants in
three cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada:9 four litigants, four lawyers, one expert
witness, and one representative of a community organization that intervened in one of the cases.
The last interview proved not to be useful to this project except for general background
information, as the participant’s direct knowledge of the organization’s involvement in the
litigation was limited. I interviewed each participant once for 60-90 minutes. The interviews
were conducted in a semi-structured format, allowing participants to construct their own
narratives.
This project also contains a second data set comprised of documents more familiar to legal
analysis: transcripts of testimony, written submissions, and transcripts of oral arguments. These
texts are used as a source of “triangulation”: an additional data set used to verify or challenge the
conclusions drawn from the analysis of interview transcripts.10

8

See Ping-Chun Hsiung, Lives and Legacies (2010), online: http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~pchsiung/LAL/
Case selection is explained in section 2.1.
10
I began to analyze the data using the method of “open coding,” reading the transcripts and documents line by line,
and generating as many “codes” as possible. The codes describe the thoughts, feelings, and intentions in the
document at a slightly higher level of abstraction, in order to allow for comparison to other data. One of the codes
generated during open-coding of interview transcripts was “cross-cultural communication.” With this in mind, I
revisited all the data using the method of “focused” coding, in searching for more instances of cross-cultural
communication. This prompted further theoretical research which I then brought back into conversation with the
data. See Hsiung, ibid.
9
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Once the interview data were gathered, I began the process of “open coding.” Open coding
involves reading the transcripts and documents line-by-line, and generating as many “codes” as
possible.11 The codes describe the thoughts, feelings and intentions of the respondent at a slightly
higher level of abstraction, in order to allow for comparison to other data. The codes can be
descriptive or analytical. For example, where a respondent tells a story about her upbringing,
different codes might mark the emotions she describes, the role of religious ritual, or ideas about
identity. Once the open coding process was complete and I had generated a set of stable codes, I
revisited all the data using the method of “focused” coding. In this method, data are re-coded in
the light of a specific theme.12 For example, on the basis of codes generated during open coding,
I revisited all the transcripts with a specific focus on the rules of a religion, and again searching
for instances of cross-cultural communication. I used a computer application designed for
qualitative research, Weft QDA,13 to assist with the aggregation of the coded data and allow for
easier comparison across interviews.
To be sure, this is a small sample; however, the size of the sample is less relevant in
qualitative inquiry than the depth of the data collected. The goal here is to generate new
theoretical insights steeped in real life experiences and provide detailed pictures of a particular
context rather than to posit general conclusions. Another limitation of the study is that interview
participants were all, with one exception, on the side of those claiming religious freedom.
However, the perspectives opposing parties and judges are brought to light through the textual
sources discussed above. The judicial decisions, oral arguments of the parties, and exchanges
during cross-examination are all communicative acts that can be analyzed.

11

Hsiung, supra note 8, online: <http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~pchsiung/LAL/analysis/opencoding>.
Ibid, <http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~pchsiung/LAL/analysis/focusedcoding>.
13
“Weft QDA is an easy-to-use, free and open-source tool for the analysis of textual data such as interview
transcripts, fieldnotes and other documents.” online: “Weft QDA” <http://www.pressure.to/qda/>.
12
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2.1. Case Selection
As noted above, this project focuses on three religious freedom cases brought to the Supreme
Court of Canada. I chose these cases for four reasons. First, because these cases had several
rounds of trial and appeal, participants had multiple interactions with the state legal system on a
question of religious importance. Second, in all of the cases, participants had both successful and
unsuccessful encounters with the state legal system and its rules on religious freedom. This
allowed participants to provide insight into a broader range of experience. Third, in all cases, the
religious freedom claimants sought an exception from a generally applicable rule, making
comparisons across cases more fruitful. Finally, because these cases were pursued to the
Supreme Court, each has a large and centralized documentary record.14
3. Cross-Cultural Communication and its Relevance for Religious Freedom
Most scholarly “definitions agree that communication is a symbolic process by which people
create shared meanings.”15 Cross-cultural communication involves the creation of shared
meanings across cultural boundaries. Following Parekh, I view culture as a
historically created system of meaning and significance or… a system of beliefs and
practices in terms of which a group of human beings understand, regulate and

14

Other notable cases involving religious issues decided in the last 20 years include R v NS, 2012 SCC 72, where the
Court set guidelines for determining whether a sexual assault complainant can wear a niqab while testifying, and SL
v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, which held that a mandatory public school course in “Ethics and
Religious Culture” did not violate a student’s religious freedom. The Supreme Court had not decided these cases
when the study began, and were excluded on this basis. However, the decision to exclude Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007
SCC 54, holding that the failure to provide a religious divorce is compensable in damages, was more complicated.
Ultimately, I excluded this case because it did not fit the pattern of a minority group seeking an exemption from a
generally applicable policy. I judged that this would make comparison more difficult. The case, however, merits
further study, raising complicated issues of religious freedom on both sides of the dispute. I also chose to exclude B
(R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, which upheld a wardship order over an
infant when her parents refused blood transfusions on the basis of their religious beliefs. This case falls less clearly
into the pattern of a minority religious group seeking an exemption from a generally applicable policy.
15
Houman A. Sadri & Madelyn Flammia, Intercultural Communication: A New Approach to International
Relations and Global Challenges (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011) at 10.
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structure their individual and collective lives. It is a way of both understanding and
organizing human life.16
Culture pervades all communicative activities;17 moral concepts and political and economic
institutions are all situated in a particular cultural context.18 It follows that notions of justice and
legality and their associated institutions are embedded in a particular culture and given shape by
their historical context. This is not to say, however, that communicative acts are culturally
determined. Rather, this project assumes a dynamic relationship between individuals and the
multiple cultures in which they are situated. When individuals communicate they are active
agents, drawing on the languages, ideas, forms, and other aspects of these cultures.19 Moreover,
many have noted that cultural communities have always already begun to communicate with
each other at some level.20
Cross-cultural communication is inherent in much religious freedom litigation. Benjamin
Berger argues that “the meeting of law and religion is not a juridical or technical problem but,
rather, an instance of cross-cultural encounter.”21 According to Berger, most accounts fail to see
that “the constitutional rule of law is, itself, a cultural system… composed of sets of symbols,
categories of thought, and particular practices that lend meaning to experience.”22 The individual
participants in activities within Canadian legal culture, represented in this paper primarily by the
judges who wrote the decisions, no doubt have complex cultural identities of their own. They
16

Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Houndmills: Macmillan
Press Ltd., 2000) at 143.
17
Ibid at 143-144.
18
Ibid at 151.
19
Parekh, supra note 16 at 157. See also Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical
Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 Can JL & Soc 25.
20
See, e.g., Parkeh, supra note 16 at 163:
Every cultural community exists in the midst of others and is inescapably influenced by them. It
might borrow their technology, and the latter is never culturally neutral. It might also be
consciously and unconsciously influenced by their beliefs and practices.
21
Berger, “Cultural Limits” supra note 40 at 246.
22
Ibid at 246. See also Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008) at 4-5: “even where specialization intense, law does not exist in isolation. To understand how a culture is put
together and operates, therefore, one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law, one cannot fail to see it as part of
culture.”
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likely even shared some cultural elements with the litigants before them – they may have had
some familiarity with a religious tradition, they certainly shared a language, and they may have
lived in or near the places where the disputes arose. However, while there is some cultural
diversity on the bench,23 superior court judges in Canada must generally be members of a
provincial bar for 10 years, and it is likely that they received their legal education in Canada.24
When they write their decisions, they speak principally according to the conventions of the legal
culture, using the rules and symbols of that culture to decide how to legally classify the practices
and then explain that classification in its judgments in a manner consistent with precedent.
To put this more concretely, in the cases under review, prior to the litigation, litigants
ascribed a meaning to an object of religious faith based on their particular religious and cultural
background. These practices were mostly unfamiliar to the Canadian legal system, and would
likely not have figured in the legal education or discourse of the relevant judges prior to these
cases. In order to make these practices intelligible to the courts, litigants (through their counsel)
were required to communicate across a cultural boundary with the judges deciding upon the
validity of the restriction and regulation of the practices.25 Accordingly, it is worthwhile to reexamine the cases and experiences of participants through the theoretical and practical
considerations developed in the field of cross-cultural communication.26 Before moving on to
look at these, some further discussion of the term “culture” is required.

23

Rosemary Cairns Way, however, conducted a study of 94 judicial appointments made between April 2012 and
March 2014. Only one of these was non-white (though the respective races of 12 of the judges was not known) and
only 37 were women: Sean Fine, “Tories chastised for lack of racial diversity in judicial appointments” The Globe
and Mail (10 April 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
24
Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, s 3. Alternatively, a person may be named a judge if, “after becoming a barrister or
advocate at the bar of any province, [he or she] exercised powers and performed duties and functions of a judicial
nature on a full-time basis in respect of a position held pursuant to a law of Canada or a province.”
25
The considerations of cross-cultural communication specific to the litigation context are further explored below in
section 4.
26
Notably, the participants did not frame their experiences using the term “cross-cultural communication,” nor was
term suggested to them in interviews because I did not want to impose my own conceptual frame on their narratives
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3.1. What is Good Cross-Cultural Communication?
3.1.1. Typology of Cross-Cultural Encounters
Fred Dallmayr’s work provides a helpful starting point for distinguishing successful from
unsuccessful cross-cultural communication. He posits six modes of encounter: conquest,
conversion, assimilation, enculturation, relative indifference, and dialogical engagement.27 These
modes may appear separately or they may overlap. According to Dallmayr, cultural hegemony is
exercised in domestic settings under the terms “assimilation” or “enculturation.”28 In some cases,
the encounter may be marked by “a pattern of mutual adjustment or reciprocal give-and-take
which, in turn, can engender an ambivalent syncretism or a precarious type of cultural
juxtaposition or coexistence.”29 Dallmayr terms this form of engagement “relative indifference,”
and argues that modern liberalism often results in this kind of encounter. Dallmayr is particularly
concerned with the “proceduralist” accounts of liberalism, associated with thinkers such as John
Rawls, which “support only a limited procedural rule system or a government that ‘governs
least,’ while relegating concrete life-forms to the status of privatized folklore.”30 This has the
effect of stifling cross-cultural engagement as so-called private matters are no longer appropriate
subjects for public discussion.31
Dallmayr holds out dialogical engagement as an ideal type of cross-cultural encounter in
which “exposure to alien cultural strands may initiate a movement of genuine selftransformation… a reassessment of prevailing patterns in light of newly experienced insights or
while they were recounting them. The labeling of these encounters as cross-cultural derives from my own analysis
of the data and engagement with the literature.
27
Fred R Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1996) at Chapter 1. Benjamin Berger’s work on cross-cultural encounter in the Canadian religious
freedom case law draws on Dallmayr’s typology and is discussed below in section 4.
28
Ibid at 14.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid at 24.
31
Ibid at 26.
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modes of life.”32 Charles Taylor takes a similar approach, arguing that, in the course of
successful cross-cultural communication,
[w]e learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken
for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility
alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture.33
The end result is a “fusion of horizons,” a term Taylor borrows from Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Gadamer construes the comprehension of texts and historical events “not on the model of the
‘scientific’ grasp of an object but rather on that of speech partners who come to an
understanding.”34 For Taylor, this conversational approach applies to “all knowledge of the other
as such.”35 Every partner in dialogue carries his or her own basic understandings of human life36
and must take a “frequently painful” journey that “passes through the patient identification and
undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding that distort the reality of the other.”37 A
fruitful encounter creates “a language that bridges those of both knower and known… The
‘fusion’ comes about when one (or both) undergo a shift; the horizon is extended to make room
for the object that before did not fit within it.”38
3.1.2. Analytic Tools

32

Ibid at 18.
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) at
67.
34
Charles Taylor, “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes” in Jeff Malpas et al,
eds, Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002) 279 at
280. Dallmayr is also influenced by Gadamer, which helps explain the resonance in Dallmayr and Taylor’s work.
See Fred Dallmayr, “Hermeneutics and inter-cultural dialog: linking theory and practice” (2009) 2(1) Ethics and
Global Politics 23 (arguing that Gadamer’s approach can be helpful in the field of cross-cultural communication as a
means of combating the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis).
35
Taylor, “Understanding”, ibid at 280.
36
E.g., “our ordinary understanding of what it is to be a human agent, live in society, have moral convictions, aspire
to happiness,” ibid at 284.
37
Ibid at 285, 296.
38
Taylor, “Understanding the Other,” at 287.
33
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To aid in this process, Taylor argues, “[w]e need… a threefold distinction: norms, legal
forms, and background justifications.”39 These analytical distinctions allow for greater clarity in
dialogue and make it possible for people coming from different cultural contexts to agree on a
particular norm without necessarily sharing the same justification for that norm. For example,
most would likely agree with the norm that the law should treat all individuals equally. But this
does not provide a framework for how the norm should be given legal form, nor does it imply
agreement on the background justification for the norm. Some believe that equal treatment is
justified on the basis that all are God’s creatures, while others prefer a non-theological
justification. A successful dialogue around the shared norm would allow each participant insight
into the other’s background justification, leading to a legal form that could accommodate them
all while remaining open to future changes.
Dwight Newman expands upon Taylor’s distinction between norms and background
justifications by differentiating “values” from “concepts.” Value-based differences represent a
choice among values that may be incommensurable. On the other hand, concept-based
differences deal with prior questions about how notions like “law” are conceived. For example,
“an Aboriginal community operating with a conception of law that emphasizes harmony and
natural order rather than positivistic rights may initially have different perceptions about the way
in which a court should adjudicate a particular case.”40 How should those engaged in the dialogue
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Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights” in Joanne R Bauer & Daniel A Bell,
eds, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 124 at 143.
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Dwight G Newman, “You Still Know Nothin’ ’Bout Me: Toward Cross-Cultural Theorizing of Aboriginal
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resolve these different types of differences? According to Newman, concept-based differences do
not necessarily call for resolution; concepts operate as “mental placeholders for elements of
physical, moral, or other reality,” leaving room for dialoguers to reach agreements on norms
expressed as propositions.41 When it comes to value-based disagreements, after an attempt to
“carefully understand the values of the other culture and seek ways of reconciling these values
with one’s own,”42 it may be that dialogue partners must leave their differences unresolved at a
given time.43 In other words, success in cross-cultural communication does not imply agreement.
Rather, success turns on all parties maintaining two key values: respect for their partners and
awareness of their own culturally contingent notions.
3.1.3. Respect
Authors from various disciplines emphasize the important role that mutual respect plays in
facilitating cross-cultural communication.44 Writing about translation—itself a form of crosscultural communication—James Boyd White emphasizes the importance of maintaining respect
for diverging perspectives and recognizing their value. For White, the act of translation
recognizes the other… as a center of meaning apart from oneself… Good translation
thus proceeds not by the motives of dominance of acquisition, but by respect. It is a
together, provides a constitutional bedrock on which to build a theory of cross-cultural communication in the area of
religious freedom. See Benjamin Berger, “The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21 Can JL & Juris 245. at
248-249; see also Lori Beaman, “Is Religious Freedom Impossible in Canada?” (2012) 8(2) Law, Culture and the
Humanities 266.
41
Newman, ibid at 740.
42
Ibid at 743.
43
Ayelet Shachar has given detailed consideration to the institutional structures that might encourage such dialogues
to be most sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable members of minority groups, usually women and children,
suggesting an approach she calls “transformative accommodation”: see Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions:
Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
44
See eg Ken Tsutsumibayashi, “Fusion of Horizons or Confusion of Horizons? Intercultural Dialogue and Its
Risks” (2005) 11 Global Governance 103 at 111: “[m]utual trust and respect are the key to achieving a meaningful
intercultural dialogue”; Parekh, supra note 16 at 240-241: “[w]e can hardly be said to respect a person if we treat
with contempt or abstract away all that gives meaning to his life and makes him the kind of person he is.” Taylor has
argued that there is something valid, though not unproblematic, in a presumption that all cultures are entitled to
equal respect. This presumption stems from the claim “that all human cultures that have animated whole societies
over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings”: Charles Taylor,
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) at 66.
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word for a set of practices by which we learn to live with difference, with the fluidity
of culture and with the instability of the self.45
This notion of translation has much to offer in analyzing moments of cross-cultural encounter,
where participants may speak different languages and draw on different sets of concepts, values,
and norms.
Respect, however, does not imply that those engaged in dialogue must refrain from all
criticism of other cultures’ norms. Rather, it requires an attempt to understand other background
justifications and concepts before deciding to reject differing norms or legal forms.46 Admittedly,
the line between openness to other perspectives and moral relativism is sometimes difficult to
trace in the abstract. Parekh helps focus this distinction by contrasting respectful criticism with
the attempt to mould another in one’s own image. For example, it is consistent with the value of
respect to require other cultures to safeguard human dignity. However, requiring that human
dignity be maintained through the particular framework of liberal individualism is to hold a
different culture to an unjust standard.47 Maintaining the balance between legitimate criticism
and a culturally specific standard requires those engaged in cross-cultural communication to have
a strong sense of self-awareness, the value to which I turn next.
3.1.4. Self-Awareness
There is no individual who operates without culture, and remaining aware of one’s own
culturally contingent views is integral to effective cross-cultural communication.48 Richard
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James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990) at 257. White’s book takes an aesthetic approach to judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court,
arguing that all justice is a form of translation.
46
Parekh, supra note 16 at 176-177.
47
Ibid.
48
Though this is something of a truism in contemporary discussions of multiculturalism, Wendy Brown argues that
liberal discourses often deploy the notion of culture asymmetrically. “[T]hough ‘culture’ is what nonliberal peoples
are imagined to be ruled and ordered by, liberal peoples are considered to have culture or cultures.” Wendy Brown,
Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at
150; Taylor, “Unforced Consensus,” supra note 39 at 143; Sherene H. Razack, “The ‘Sharia Law Debate’ in
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Brislin and Tomok Yoshida take a practical approach to developing and maintaining selfawareness.49 They emphasize that those engaged in cross-cultural encounters must learn to be at
ease with ongoing disagreement and multiple ways of seeing a similar issue.50
The ability to maintain awareness of one’s own culture also requires the rejection of the
notion of cultural purity, i.e. that one culture has developed in isolation from others. “[C]ultures
have always been in contact,”51 and levels of cultural hybridity are multiplied in countries with
high rates of immigration.52 Imagining cultures as pure tends to distort them. With respect to
one’s own culture, it can reinforce the tendency to see culturally based values as natural or
neutral. The notion of cultural purity can also serve to essentialize and oversimplify cultures that
are not one’s own, embedding the assumption that another’s culture determines his/her
behaviour, or that an individual or community is best understood with reference to their
“culture.” This line of thought exaggerates the distances between cultures and makes barriers to
communication seem more overwhelming. Thus, though the field of cross-cultural
communication studies owes its existence to cultural differences, a crucial aspect of maintaining
self-awareness is being careful not to overstate those differences to the point of reification.
This detailed concept of self-awareness allows for more refined analysis in section 5 below.
Before turning to that analysis, I develop the argument that cross-cultural communication
provides a useful framework for analyzing legal disputes.
Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction in Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture” (2007) 15 Fem
Legal Stud 3 at 27.
49
Other practically-minded authors also emphasize the importance of self-awareness and tolerance for ambiguity,
sometimes under the labels of mindfulness and tolerance for uncertainty, see Brooks Peterson, Cultural Intelligence:
A Guide to Working with People from other Cultures (Yarmouth: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2004) at 89-92;
David C Thomas & Kerr Inkson, Cultural intelligence: Living and working globally (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, 2009) at chapter 3.
50
Ibid at 31, 40.
51
Martin & Nakayama, ibid at 59
52
Melissa L Curtin, “Coculturation: Toward A Critical Theoretical Framework of Cultural Adjustment” in Thomas
K Nakayama and Rona Tamiko Halualani, eds, The Handbook of Critical Intercultural Communication (Blackwell
Publishing, 2010) 270 at 280.

16

4. Legal Culture as Participant in Cross-Cultural Communication
In this section, I build on Berger’s claim that the meeting of law and religion is a crosscultural encounter, examining the power relationships at stake in these dialogues and considering
ways judges might best respond to religious freedom claims that involve alternative cultural
viewpoints.
4.1. The Nature of the Dialogue
When religious freedom claims are litigated, the dialogue about the claims involves several
participants: the claimants, the opposing party (sometimes a government actor), the judge(s),
witnesses called by the parties, and, sometimes, intervenors who provide the court with
additional perspectives. The courts’ power to enforce state norms makes any such dialogue
asymmetrical.53 The most obvious aspect of this unequal power dynamic is that, once the parties
have finished stating their cases, the court releases a judgment that explains its decision and an
order that governs parties’ behaviour. This order is often backed by the threat of the state’s
police power.
Relatedly, litigants and their counsel are required to observe particular requirements set by
courts and legislatures when submitting their arguments and evidence to court. The court retains
power over the parties to limit their representations throughout the case. This has a peculiar
effect on dialogue. As Diana Eades notes,
There are good legal reasons why witnesses’ stories are filtered, organised and
restricted in the courtroom… such as the prohibition on hearsay evidence, or the
strategy of a lawyer in examination-in-chief preventing a witness from introducing
any matters which may damage their case… But, the way in which a witness’s story
has to be filtered through lawyer questions is a fundamental sociolinguistic problem
for the ability of witnesses to tell their own story in their own way. It is also a
53

Berger, ibid at 276.
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fundamental sociolinguistic problem for the ability of a court to hear, understand and
assess the competing stories which form the basis of a courtroom hearing.54
The power relation also plays out through a set of prior commitments that serve to limit the
range of successful arguments that can be made to courts. One such prior commitment of
Canadian constitutional law is individualism. Berger has argued persuasively that Canada’s
jurisprudence treats religion individualistically in three different ways: by focusing on the
individual aspects of religion at the expense of its communal aspects, by treating religion as a
matter of choice, and by treating religion as essentially private.55 When contrasted with
alternative worldviews emerging from other cultural origins, it becomes clear that this
individualistic approach is a facet of Canadian legal culture rather than an objective, neutral
interpretation of religion. First, the deep collectivism of the Hutterite worldview, discussed in
more detail below, reveals a view of religion at odds with the Court’s focus on the individual
aspects of religious practice. Employing Taylor’s terminology,56 the differences here arise both at
the level of background justification and at the level of norms. Second, those who conceive of
religion as a matter of choice approach the concept of religion quite differently from adherents of
faith who ascribe spiritual consequences to matters outside their control, such as certain
indigenous American religious traditions.57 Third, the notion that religion should be restricted to
the private sphere represents a value-based difference for those who believe that faith permeates
all aspects of their lives and should govern their public and private selves, or for whom the
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Diana Eades, “Telling and Retelling Your Story in Court: Questions, Assumptions and Intercultural Implications”
(2008) 20 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 209 at 211-212 (emphasis in original).
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Benjamin L Berger, “Law's Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 277; see also Howard
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public/private distinction takes on a different meaning.58 Indeed, in many parts of the world,
religion is an integral part of public legal discourse.59 Accordingly, Canadian law’s
individualistic approach is hardly a universal or neutral way to understand religion.60

A second prior commitment of Canadian law is the distinction between beliefs and
practices. As Lori Beaman notes, though religious freedom litigation always focuses on religious
practices, the legal tests associated with religious freedom (developed in Amselem) require that
claimants first and foremost demonstrate a sincere belief, and then connect the practice at issue
to that belief.61 In this two-step analysis, the assumption is that “[r]ituals and embodied practices
are taken to be symbolic rather than constitutive of faith, and as ultimately about belief.”62
Following Winnifred Sullivan,63 Beaman argues that this understanding has roots in Protestant
Christianity. However, such a neat distinction between belief and practice is at odds with more
practice-based religions or, more commonly, situations in which practice and belief are
interwoven and neither is truly prior to the other.64 Admittedly, there are significant distinctions
between beliefs and practices;65 however, the conceptual distinction and sense of sequence
58
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(practices follow from beliefs) operates as an unspoken assumption that structures cross-cultural
dialogues in religious freedom litigation, and the assumption is not shared equally by all
participants.
In sum, the power imbalance between courts and litigants is played out on several levels.
Courts can tell litigants what to do, and their orders can come with significant coercive threats.
Courts also regulate the way in which the dialogue can be carried out by controlling the rules of
evidence and procedure and by setting the terms of the discussion.

Is it possible to give voice to alternative expressions when the power relations are so
imbalanced? James Boyd White draws attention to the role of the lawyer, who guides her client
in crafting a story that is (ideally) both authentic and comprehensible to state justice institutions:
Think now of the life of the lawyer: in her conversations with her client, from the
beginning, her task is to help him tell his story, both in his own language and in the
languages into which she will translate it… between them they create a series of texts
that are necessarily imperfect translations of the client’s story into legal terms, and in
doing so they also create something new, a discourse in which this story, and others,
can have meaning and force of a different kind: the meaning and force of law.66
In section 5.2.1 I will consider moments in the Multani litigation where counsel and the
intervening organizations were successful, to some degree, in doing just this. Before turning to
the case studies, however, I examine the ways judges might best respond in the context of a
cross-cultural encounter.

concrete. Secondly, while beliefs are not easy to discover and enforce, conformity to practices is
easily ascertainable and enforceable. Thirdly, beliefs primarily pertain to the realm of thought and
practices to that of conduct… Fourthly, coherence among beliefs is a matter intellectual consistency
and is different in nature from that among practices where it is basically a matter of practical
compatibility.
66
White, Justice as Translation, supra note 45 at 260-261.
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4.2. How is a Judge to respond?
Given the structural power imbalances of litigation, can judges act in a way that gives
greater expression to the ideals of respect and self-awareness? Jeremy Webber proposes a
judicial ethic designed to avoid claims of gender and cultural bias. He argues that the process of
judgment ought to reflect a “rational search for normative reconciliation,”67 ultimately producing
a synthesis of the multiple perspectives relevant to the case. Webber notes that the reconciliation
of opposing viewpoints “will often be impossible.”68 His view of judgment, however, is not
meant to produce a single conception of justice, once and for all. Rather, he self-consciously
aspires to achieve that which he says is unattainable: a view of justice “that comprehends human
experience in its entire range and diversity.”69 When judges remain open to alternative normative
perspectives, they are constantly reshaping the conception of justice to more closely approximate
this ideal.

Webber’s judicial ethic assumes a process wherein norms are constantly contested and
evolving.70 From this vantage point, even though a judgment of the Supreme Court is legally
final, it does not mark the end of the story for participants or for the contest over norms. While
judges may have powerful voices, other actors can nonetheless continue the conversation after
judgment is rendered. Within the state’s legal institutions, this may take the form of a dialogue
between disagreeing judges, between courts and legislatures, or between legislatures and
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government-sponsored initiatives.71 The contest extends further still, as cultural communities,
professional associations, academic commentators, media organizations, and other social groups
respond to the judicial decisions in their own ways.72

This ongoing contest may reflect the “inherently indeterminate” nature of the complex
reasoning involved in resolving normative conflicts linked to cultural differences.73 More
optimistically, it can also be taken to indicate openness to new ideas and potential for mutual
change arising from dialogue. Becoming comfortable with this ongoing contest may be a key to
participating effectively in the dialogue. In this respect, one lesson of cross-cultural
communication for judges is that their decisions are final only as far as the law is concerned. The
impact of the particular decision and its future applications will likely be a matter of further
contest and dialogue between legal institutions, communities, and individuals. Maintaining this
humility stems from the more general values of respect and self-awareness identified above;
courts must respect the independent agency of the parties before them, and remain aware that the
authority of their decisions is an aspect of the prevailing constitutional culture rather than a
culturally neutral attribute.
5. Cross-Cultural Communication in the Data
Having examined general considerations related to cross-cultural dialogue and some
concerns more specific to the legal context, I now apply these insights to the data collected for
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the three cases under review. The discussion below will consider some of the cross-cultural
encounters leading up to litigation, and analyze the dialogue that occurred in the context of the
litigation process. The very nature of this process creates a structural obstacle for meaningful
exchange as parties are expected to behave as adversaries; for this reason, the encounters that
occurred between the opposing parties were often marked by a lack of respect or self-awareness.
Nevertheless, exploring in detail how religious freedom claimants sought to make themselves
understood to opposing parties and to the courts reveals significant moments of cross-cultural
communication. I will argue that the values of respect and self-awareness were crucial in
determining the success of a cross-cultural exchange. A consideration of these narratives
demonstrates that litigants often attribute their lack of success to a court’s misunderstanding of
their cultural practices. It can be challenging to distinguish a litigation failure from a
communication failure. One might expect an unsuccessful litigant in any case, whether or not it
involves cross-cultural communication, might feel that the court did not understand their
perspective. For this article, a failure of cross-cultural communication is found when there is
evidence that a Court has deliberately avoided engaging with an unfamiliar cultural practice or
demonstrates that it does not take the practice – rather than its regulation – on the terms
presented by the practitioners. In other words, I believe it possible for a court to communicate
effectively across a cultural barrier while finding against a religious freedom claimant. In the
cases under review, however, I find that the more effective cross-cultural communication is to be
found where the religious freedom claimants were successful.
5.1. Amselem
As noted above, Amselem centred on the installation of succoth in a condominium
complex in apparent contravention of the complex’s bylaws. Succoth are huts with leafy or other
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vegetative roof coverings, a remembrance of the temporary dwellings the Israelites used en route
from Egypt to Canaan. Some Jews erect succoth during the annual eight-day holiday of Succoth.
A central dispute at trial was whether there was a Jewish obligation to erect one’s own succah or
whether using a communal succah would suffice.
One litigant described his experience at a meeting of the co-owners of his building prior
to the litigation in Amselem in profoundly negative terms. He felt that he had been treated as a
religious fundamentalist, a “Khomeini.”74 He viewed this as a moment of misrecognition by the
other co-owners that made him wish never to return to a co-owners meeting. It is apparent that
the litigant did not feel that he had been accorded respect required for a successful cross-cultural
exchange. This may partially account for the escalation of the dispute. Indeed, according to the
litigant, his interactions with the condo board of co-owners left him feeling a “scent of antiSemitism,”75 which contributed to his decision to pursue litigation. As an example of this, he
pointed to the condo board’s position that a super-majority of 90% of the voting shares in the
building would be required to allow for the succah installation, which the litigant characterized
as “à la Saddam Hussein.”76 Interestingly, as can be seen in these passages, the litigant drew on
his own culturally-based perceptions of who qualifies as a villain, ie Hussein and Khomeini, to
communicate to the interviewer his feeling of having been treated unfairly.
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5.1.1. Adversarial Dialogues
The litigation began with the parties exchanging affidavits, and each witness was then
cross-examined by opposing counsel. In this context, counsel for condo board demonstrated
some of the skills and values associated with successful cross-cultural communication. For
example, in prefacing questions about witnesses’ succah practices, opposing counsel
demonstrated self-awareness, explaining that his own knowledge of the practice was limited:
you have to bear in mind that I personally may not know, and although I have some
basic idea of what a succah is, what it stands for, what it means to you, I may ask you
questions unfortunately that you may find either amusing or maybe not relevant.77
Displaying his inquisitiveness, counsel sought clarification regarding the internal complexities of
Montreal’s Jewish community, specifically the differences in succah practices between
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews.78 This spirit of openness led to some poignant moments of crosscultural communication. For example, in order to explain the holiday of Shemini Atzereth, which
immediately follows the Succoth holiday but is not technically part of Succoth,79 one litigant
explained that he continued to use the succah during those days to express his desire to be near to
God. This element of his practice is meant to express: “we want to stay one more day with You,
God… we don’t want to leave abruptly… like someone accompanying a departing king.”80 The
analogy to the departing king makes an unfamiliar cultural practice accessible to opposing
counsel.
77
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If these conversations were held outside the litigation context, counsel for the condo
board might be read simply as curious, seeking to understand the meaning of the succah to the
litigant. But the litigation context alters that dynamic. In addition to learning about the holiday
and community,81 opposing counsel sought to draw out inconsistencies in the litigants’ religious
practice or other weaknesses in their case. For example, counsel for the condo board was
concerned with times during a litigant’s life when he did not observe the succah practice; times
when a litigant did not have a succah at his own house; whether, when a litigant was married but
did not have children, he felt “morally obliged to go to [his sister’s succah] or could… have
skipped a day”; whether a litigant ate his dinners but not his lunches in the succah, or was able to
eat snacks outside the succah; and whether the litigant’s friends and relatives build succoth.82 Of
course, the condo board’s counsel cannot be faulted for all this. It was his professional obligation
to uncover inconsistencies in the facts alleged by the opposing parties. This is simply one of the
structural obstacles to effective communication in the litigation context. Arguably, this
contributed to some of the communication breakdowns to which I now turn.

In some exchanges, opposing counsel showed tendencies associated with poor crosscultural communication, imposing his own assumptions on litigants. For instance, he adopted the
assumption, discussed in section 4.1, that practices and beliefs are neatly distinguishable. He
81
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asked the litigant, “To you what does… the period of Succoth represent?” The litigant
responded, “It’s a holiday that I keep as I was thought [sic] from my childhood.” This answer did
not satisfy the condo board’s counsel, so he continued, “But what meaning does it have, do you
know… what it represents in the Jewish religion?” The litigant’s answer was somewhat vague,
as if the question itself did not make sense to him: “The story is subscribed [sic] in the Book, it’s
part of the harvest day and part of the remembrance of the difficulties that the Jews went through
from the expulsion of Egypt.”83 A similar exchange occurred when opposing counsel asked a
different witness about the mezuzah84 he has affixed to his doorpost:
Q- What message does [the mezuzah] send?
A- I can’t really tell you exactly what, - if it is…
Q- I will ask you a more simpler [sic] question. Why did you put one up?
A- I put one up because it is a biblical obligation to put one on your door.85
The communication difficulties in these exchanges suggest that the “belief before practice”
paradigm was not a perfect fit for at least some of the litigants. In Newman’s terminology, this
represents a conceptual difference regarding the relationship between norms and their
background justifications. Though the two are related in the litigants’ accounts, the relationship
is not linear; practice and belief reinforce one another, neither is prior to the other.
Notably, however, another litigant independently described the “message” in Succoth as
the shedding of material goods, the recognition of life’s fragility and God’s power. This signals
some variations in approach amongst the succah-building litigants, with at least one narrative
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fitting more closely into the belief-begetting-practice paradigm. However, the litigant and
opposing counsel also engaged in a prolonged discussion regarding whether the litigant had a
religious obligation to eat warm food on Succoth or if he could rather satisfy his religious
obligations by eating cold food. After a series of oblique answers, finally the litigant said: “It’s
part of the holiday… On a holiday you must make things as pleasant as possible for you and for
the Lord.”86 Taken together, these statements indicate that the notion that one could find a textual
source for all aspects of practice is overly simplistic, that the sources of the obligation are
multiple, and that the belief and the practice are not easily separated. Indeed, the litigant went on
to explain, “the succah envelops the human being in its entirety, in its body and in its soul.”87
Further communication difficulties arose as counsel attempted to draw other distinctions
that did not seem relevant to litigants. For instance, counsel posed the following question of one
litigant:
Now, if I was to try to separate… the religious tradition from the tradition itself that
is not necessarily religious, would you say that to bring expensive items is a religious
obligation or is it more of an old tradition to make it more festive?88
The litigant resisted this compartmentalization: “It’s actually a religious affair, it’s even written
somewhere in the Holy Books that you should bring in expensive nice things to your place to
have the festive [sic] in its full value.”89
In the same vein, in discussing whether a litigant took a meal in the succah, counsel
attempted to distinguish between a complete meal and a symbolic meal where only bread and
wine are eaten. The litigant answered that “there is no symbolic meal,” and went on to discuss
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some of the minutiae of what constitutes a meal in Jewish law (30 grams of bread, in the
litigant’s account).90 Thus, while for the litigant there was a distinction between what did or did
not constitute a meal, the notion of the symbolic meal did not make sense. Likewise, another
litigant had difficulty answering counsel’s question about the relative importance of Succoth and
other Jewish holidays, explaining that “every Jewish holiday is important” and saying that he did
not understand the nature of the question.91 The exchanges in these instances suffer because the
condo board’s counsel attempted to impose categories from the state legal culture’s
understanding of religion onto the litigants’ religious practices.

Once the matter moved to the courts, the litigants’ counsel generally spoke from within
state legal frameworks. Counsel explained the litigants’ claims in the language of legislation,
contracts, property, and other categories familiar to the courts. There were moments, however,
when counsel attempted to speak from the religious practitioners’ perspectives and make their
particular religious practices comprehensible. As counsel for B’nai Brith Canada put it to the
Court,
if you’re celebrating Soukot with my family, that’s perfectly acceptable under Jewish
law, but if it’s a hardship… if it becomes a “corvée exceptionnelle” for you to
celebrate Soukot with my family, with my kids yelling in the succah and perhaps
another five families, then you are not only supposed to, but you are forbidden under
Jewish law to celebrate Soukot in that fashion.92
Interestingly, the lawyer who made these representations soon drew an analogy to another
religious faith to illustrate his argument about religious freedom: “[The Charter] does not protect
– to use a Catholic idea, it does not protect exclusively the Pope’s version… of what a Catholic
90
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obligation is.”93 Here, the cross-cultural communication is quite rich, as counsel sought to make
his argument more accessible by referencing a religious tradition that may have been more
familiar to judges. Of course, the judges would have to eventually translate whatever
understandings they reached into the terms of Canadian constitutional culture. Nonetheless, the
reference to Catholicism might have helped judges with a Catholic or other Christian background
understand what was at stake for the Jewish claimants.
Other instances of cross-cultural communication within the adversarial process can be seen
in the involvement of rabbis under the legal category of “expert witnesses.” Opposing counsel’s
adoption of overly simplistic accounts of Jewish rituals resulted in communicative failures in
some of these exchanges. For instance, after one rabbi opined that an observant Jew should not
buy an apartment with a covered balcony because he would not be able to build a succah,
counsel for the condo board countered that another rabbi lived in the condominium complex in
just such a situation.94 Counsel here implied that the rabbi serving as an expert witness adopted
an unusual interpretation of the succah obligation. Applying a converse tactic, counsel for B’nai
Brith Canada asked a question to the condo board’s expert witness that emphasized the
differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazi observances of Succoth.95 To this, the condo
board’s rabbi replied: “There are frequently minor differences… I think that what we’re talking
about is basically applicable in both communities.”96 Both of these lines of questioning
demonstrate an oversimplification of practices within the Jewish community; the first glosses
over the internal diversity of Jewish practice, the second overstates the differences found along
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intra-communal lines. Perhaps unconsciously, these reductionist accounts represent both a lack
of respect and a lack of self-awareness. In a more ideal form of cross-cultural communication
counsel would have reflected on their own cultures and realized that such easy narratives fail to
capture most lived cultural experiences.

The Supreme Court’s position on expert testimony in religious freedom cases may limit
opportunities for cross-cultural dialogue. In Amselem, the Court held that expert testimony was
relevant only to determine the credibility of a religious freedom claimant rather than the
objective validity of a religious practice. This has had the effect of curtailing the involvement of
expert witnesses in religious freedom cases. The expert testimony in Amselem went into a
significant amount of detail regarding Jewish law, allowing the court (potential) entry into
various views from inside Jewish culture. In contrast, there was a brief expert witness report in
Multani, but no cross-examination or oral testimony; in Wilson Colony, there was no expert
testimony. While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Amselem allows courts a way to avoid a dispute
regarding religious doctrine, it has also impoverished the opportunity for cross-cultural dialogue
in litigation. On balance, I agree with Supreme Court’s choice in Amselem; nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to reflect on its costs.

5.1.2. Judicial Responses
In some instances, counsel experienced difficulty in explaining religious practices to the
bench. One lawyer explained:
especially in the Superior Court, you got the impression that the judge was saying,
“Look… is there not a rule book? Give me the damn rule book.”… That was the
impression you got… it permeated everything, and we tried to explain to him, no sir,
there is no rule book… yes, there are hierarchy of rules, but… there is no hierarchy
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of rule-making, or rule-deciding… So we don’t have the same system, so what do
you do?97
At trial, much of the decision turned on the issue of which side could present the more coherent
account of the succah and its laws measured against the standard of rationality. I suggest that the
trial judge’s effort to come to terms with Jewish law was an unsuccessful moment of crosscultural communication. In his encounter with a religious legal culture, he used his position of
power to define the “objective” limits of the succah practice, concluding that the installation of a
succah on one’s own property is an optional practice in Judaism.

98

By imagining that such an

objective limit exists, the trial judge neglects the fluidity of cultural practices within religious
groups and, I believe, shows insufficient respect and openness to the religious claimants’
perspectives. The decision therefore does not embody the values of successful cross-cultural
communication. It is perhaps precisely because a of the risk that deeper engagement with an
unfamiliar cultural will lead courts into making this kind of pronouncement at this kind of
conclusion that the Supreme Court preferred the thinner dialogue described above.
But what does the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Amselem mean for cross-cultural
communication? Berger argues that the Court adopted a variant of liberalism’s relative
indifference. In his view, it was only because the Court was able to understand the succah
practice as a matter of individual preference that it did not seek to prevent the Amselem claimants
from erecting their succoth.99 It would be troubling, from the perspective of cross-cultural
communication, to imagine that the court applied this individualist paradigm to the succah
without engaging the claimants’ perspectives. However, in several instances it was counsel for
the succah-builders who advocated an individualist response to religious freedom: “freedom of
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conscience is as important as freedom of religion and conscience by its nature, it comes before
religion, and by its nature, can only be individual.”100 Further, counsel for the intervener, B’nai
Brith Canada, specifically advocated an approach of indifference:
it’s simply inappropriate for Courts to get involved in deciding on what religions
dictate and that all the judges below were wrong in saying… this is what the Jewish
religion requires, that when there’s a matter of religious controversy, the Courts
should, if at all possible, avoid the controversy and deal with other issues if they can
do so.101
Accordingly, it would be too simplistic to posit that the litigants and their counsel put forward a
version of their religion that the Supreme Court misinterpreted, or that the Supreme Court’s
application of concepts from the state legal culture was done entirely at the judges’ own motion.
The arguments put forward by counsel make clear that there were other factors at work. The
cultural, personal, and educational backgrounds of counsel as well as the prior commitments of
the existing case law stand out as likely candidates.
In the final analysis, though, Berger’s argument is persuasive. The Court made sense of
the succah practice in liberalism’s individualistic terms, relying in part on counsels’ arguments to
come to this conclusion. The Court cared less about what the practice meant to the practitioners
and more about the fact that the practice mattered to them at all. Cross-cultural communication in
Amselem is deliberately thin and remains unconcerned about the nuances of religious experience.
While this does leave some “real liberty” for religious practitioners,102 it is disconcerting that
success depends in part on framing a religious practice as consistent with a liberal ethos.
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5.1.3.

Litigant Reflections

In contrast to some of the reflections from counsel involved in the case, the Amselem
litigant interviewed did not remark on the same communication problems with respect to the
courts. Indeed, the litigant remarked: “all of the judges who rendered judgments in this case were
right.”103 The 13 judges104 who heard this case at its various stages of appeal produced six
separate opinions, some disagreeing in the final disposition, and all demonstrating variations in
reasoning. In saying that all were correct, the litigant may have been exaggerating to make a
point; alternatively, he can be taken as demonstrating a remarkable tolerance of ambiguity.

In internalizing the judgments, the litigant put them into his own culturally familiar terms:
“when we read the judgment, it was a course in Talmud, a course in Gemarrah, it’s extraordinary
the way that one says yes, the other [says no], I find the justice in this country magnificent.
People are well informed, and bravo! ... One must be proud of this.”105 This framing of the
judgments reiterates the necessary translation that individuals perform on texts in order to ascribe
them meaning.106 It is likely that this positive attitude was influenced significantly by the
litigant’s ultimate success in the case; however, it would have been open to the litigant to express
some negative feelings towards the judgments that went against him, and he did not. In his
narrative, these sentiments were reserved for the condo board of co-owners.

5.2. Multani
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Whereas the dispute in Amselem focused on the existence of a particular religious
obligation, the communicative difficulties faced by the Multani litigants related principally to the
characterization of the kirpan as a weapon. This difficulty was experienced from the moment
that the school principal became aware of the kirpan:
the principal came up to me… she called me out of the class… and she started asking
me if I have a knife on me. I was like, I don’t have any knife… and she was like you
have weapon or a knife on you? No I don’t. She’s like, you have something under
your clothes? I’m like, yeah, I have kirpan.107
Following this exchange, the litigant described an earnest attempt to engage in dialogue:
in the beginning… we tried our best to keep our article of faith and see what people’s
opinion too. Like, we tried to make a best compromise, it has to be tightened
enough… like obviously it’s always under my clothes, nobody can see it.108
This dialogue proved fruitful. The principal and the family reached an agreement that the kirpan
would be secured in a particular way. However, as the issue escalated, the litigant described how
his family’s attempts at dialogue were rebuffed. The school officials began by proposing options
that he found unacceptable:
they were proposing… you should wear the wooden kirpan, or you should be
wearing plastic kirpan, you should wear it in your neck or something like that, very
small… if we accept that, then I’m giving up… [the] whole thing. 109
In his narrative, he was left with no choice but to hire a lawyer and take the matter to court.
Then we didn’t have any choice, we contact the local gurudwara committee… we
believe we can solve things by talking, right, dialogue? So, they tried to talk to
school… they still didn’t agree, they kept saying security issues, so we didn’t have
any choice, we met one of the lawyers.110
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5.2.1. Adversarial Dialogues
Communication problems continued after the Multani litigants retained counsel. In the
litigant’s recollection, school officials were dismissive of his family’s concerns:
And then, I think, [our lawyer] set up a meeting with the school board… We sat
together, we tried to talk to them, they didn’t listen, there were parents, there were
schools, at school board there were about 20 to 30 members... So we were there
explaining them, but they kept laughing, and they just didn’t listen to us.111
Though school officials certainly may have different recollections, this participant’s narrative
indicates a lack of basic measures being taken to ensure that participants felt that they were
respected and that their concerns were taken seriously.
When the matter came to court, the Multanis’ counsel and the expert witness they put
forward emphasized that the kirpan was not a weapon and framed the kirpan in terms of the
values it represented.112 For example, expert witness Manjit Singh explained: “The Kirpan is not
a ‘knife’ or ‘dagger’; it is quite blunt and it comes from the word ‘Kirpa’ meaning mercy and
kindness and ‘aan’ meaning honour.”113 Moreover, in an apparent effort to bridge the cultural
gap, Manjit Singh affirmed that, in the Sikh tradition, “any resistance to evil must be pacific until
all means have failed and that all people must be tolerated and treated well. In this way, Sikhism
is very similar to Christianity or Judaism.”114

The oral arguments put forth by the Multanis’ counsel contained similar themes. In his
narrative of the emergence of the Sikh religion, he emphasized the values Sikhism shares with
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Canadian constitutional culture. According to counsel, Sikhism began as a revolt against the
caste system and the unequal treatment of women, and was in favour of individual autonomy and
free expression.115 Moreover, Sikhs are in favour of integration, rather than separation.116 These
shared values had little legal relevance to the dispute; however, arguably, this framing helped to
translate the Multanis’ perspective, making it intelligible to the courts. Interestingly, counsel for
the Multanis also held up dialogue itself as a virtue. He criticized the school’s governing body
for not attempting to have a dialogue with Sikh students. Counsel focused on the affidavit of
Robert Brousseau, a former police officer who worked in the school and affirmed the large
potential for violence in the school. The Multanis’ counsel noted that Brousseau had not
attempted to speak with Sikh students before reaching this conclusion.117 In other words, the
Multanis’ counsel characterized the school officials’ behaviour, in part, as a failure of crosscultural communication.

In addition, it was significant that counsel who represented the intervening World Sikh
Organization (WSO) was personally familiar with the Sikh religion and culture. According to a
litigant, counsel for the WSO often served as an intermediary between the litigants and their own
lawyer.118 Counsel for the WSO noted that sharing common ground with both the litigants and
their counsel helped make the litigants more comfortable. This also aided in the development of
the legal case:
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certainly it was easier for [the litigant] to speak to me in those days he was a fairly
recent immigrant to Canada and his family too, I speak the language and… [the
litigant’s counsel] and I had a close enough relationship that we understood that…
we were both on the same side and we trusted each other’s instincts… I could guide
[the litigant’s counsel] and direct him, or where there were holes that he needed I
would help him or... where there were things that… he thought I was missing we
would talk about those.119
Counsel for the intervener also explained how she was able to draw connections between the
values underlying the kirpan practice and Canadian constitutional culture:
if you hear about all those ideals [associated with the kirpan], they’re very consistent
with Charter values… with Canadian values… defending the defenseless, that’s
what the Charter is all about, really right? To protect the minority against the tyranny
of the majority. And so that was a large part of our educational process with the
court, was to really be able to speak about what these articles of faith mean for the
larger Sikh community, and why they’re so important… why it’s difficult and
challenging for a Sikh to be parted from those and why that literally impacts on my
conscience…120
Borrowing from Newman and Taylor’s terminology discussed in section 3.1.2, the WSO’s effort
at cross-cultural communication emphasized that what may have appeared to be a concept-based
difference regarding the classification of the kirpan was actually a category mistake made by the
school officials. In their argument, the shared values between the two cultures should lead to the
adoption of a legal form that would allow students to wear their kirpans.
5.2.2. Engaging Judges
It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of efforts to bridge the cultural gaps between Sikh
culture and the state legal culture at the trial level. The ruling from Justice Grenier is short and
contains only the terms of an apparent settlement between the parties.121 However, in one
exchange between the trial judge and counsel, it is possible to detect the court’s impatience for
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the perceived ambiguities in Sikhism. When counsel displayed ambivalence about whether
keeping the kirpan in a leather sheath would be acceptable to his clients, Justice Grenier sought a
stable answer as to what the religion prescribed, irrespective of the Multanis’ personal position.122
Counsel did not attempt to resolve this ambiguity. Indeed, in his previous submissions he had
made reference to variation in practice within the Sikh community,123 and he had also argued that
religious beliefs were not subject to rational scrutiny.124 In responding to this particular question,
counsel merely asked for time to confer with his clients.125 In this instance counsel could not
bridge the gap between his clients’ views and the court’s desire for a rationalized version of the
Sikh religion.

In another exchange, Justice Grenier showed that she was not prepared to accept the
assertion that the kirpan was not a weapon: “perhaps for your clients a kirpan is not a knife, but
it is primarily a knife.”126 Nevertheless, Justice Grenier encouraged the parties to arrive at a
mutually acceptable solution,127 withdrawing herself from the dialogue to some degree and
inviting the parties to dialogue directly with each other.
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The Court of Appeal’s reaction was quite different. While the language of the opinion is
generally respectful and the Court acknowledges the sincere religious beliefs of the Multanis,128 it
rejected the proposition that a kirpan is not a weapon. The majority remarked that the kirpan,
“[s]tripped of its symbolic religious significance... has all of the physical characteristics of an
edged weapon.”129 This stripping of context is exemplary of a failed cross-cultural
communication. By positing a single, objective characterization of the kirpan, the decision rests
on the assumption that the court’s perception of the kirpan is without or above culture,
demonstrating a lack of self-awareness.
At the Supreme Court, the Multani litigants were able to make themselves understood in
important ways. In large measure, this was attributable to the ability of counsel to assist the
Court in maintaining self-awareness. This was achieved mainly by comparing the kirpan to other
potentially dangerous objects that were not excluded from schools. In his submissions to the
Supreme Court, for example, counsel for the Multani family asked rhetorically why the Court
should not accommodate a kirpan “when many more dangerous objects are present in the
schools…: a compass, a baseball bat, gym equipment, lab equipment which may be used to set
fires, an automobile which is used for excursions.”130 Justice Bastarache challenged this
proposition, suggesting that the reason people opposed accommodating the kirpan was “because
a kirpan is a dagger and a dagger is an arm.”131 Counsel responded by reiterating the culturally
contingent attitudes towards sharp objects:
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A kirpan is as much a dagger as a compass. A compass is a sharp object. It’s in the
shape of a dagger… A kirpan is not an arm, it’s been held over and over again… It
isn’t intended to be a weapon, it isn’t a weapon, it’s a symbol of a weapon.132
Later, the Multanis’ counsel again used analogies as a means of cross-cultural
communication. Counsel described the kirpan as symbolizing resistance to oppression, drawing
links to cultural artefacts with which judges of the Court would be familiar, such as the lyrics to
O Canada and La Marseillaise.133 Further, echoing an argument advanced in Amselem,134 the
Multanis’ counsel analogized the kirpan to other forms of religious expression more likely to be
known to the judges:
The idea that Quebec students cannot be taught the difference between a kippa and
an illegal hat or a baseball hat worn by students, that they cannot be taught the
difference between a kirpan and a knife, that they can’t be taught the difference
between a scarf worn by a Muslim girl and an illegal violation of the school uniform
is terrible and it’s very close to the views now discredited that if [a police officer]
wore a turban then, somehow, Canadians would not have respect for him.135
5.2.3. Participant Reflections
In the end, the Supreme Court was careful not to label the kirpan as a weapon, instead
describing it as “a religious object that resembles a dagger and must be made of metal.”136 For the
Multani litigants, the Supreme Court functioned as a translator to the general public:
Before… media was kind of against us too, they always calling it knife or weapon or
dagger, but right after once we won the case [in the Supreme Court] they started
calling it kirpan, specifically kirpan in the newspapers, media and everywhere.137
Perhaps because of his eventual success, the litigant was able to frame the longer narrative
in similarly positive terms, including cross-cultural encounters he experienced after the decision:
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I went to few shops… and they’ve been seeing us on TV, right? They see us, they
react, they give us a bad look and stuff, but they do come up to us and ask, oh, you’re
the same guy, oh you know, you shouldn’t do that, you’re in the community like this,
you’re supposed to live the way they live, we explained them, and then we find that
their point of view against the kirpan is changed right after we tell them.138
Likewise, in responding to the ruling, one of the lawyers involved expressed relief and
satisfaction at the result, and optimism for future cases. Her narrative expressed her hope, before
the Supreme Court hearing, that she would be understood, and her delight afterwards at feeling
that she had been:
You just say, I don’t know what the outcome’s going to be. I know what it should be,
but I just don’t know whether what I am articulating will be understood by them…
What I was blown away by when I read that judgment was that they really got it…
some of the most profoundly beautiful statements on freedom of belief and
conscience came from those eight judges. I mean, to me it’s a decision that all
Canadians ought to read just for that reason alone, because of their intuitive
understanding of what conscience was and what it meant, and what it meant to live in
this multicultural society.
…
I thought they did it, and we were profoundly grateful that we lived in a country
where we could make such arguments and have such depth of understanding with
judges who... [are] not necessarily living with Joe Average and all that but who
understood what Joga Singh Average was thinking and feeling.139
Thus the Supreme Court demonstrated to participants that it could communicate across a
significant cultural divide by taking into account the particular perspective of the Multani
claimants. On the other hand, both Benjamin Berger and Lori Beaman have suggested that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Multani may not represent a large success in terms of cross-cultural
communication. Berger argues that the Multani litigants were only successful because the Court
was able to filter their religious practice through an individualist lens;140 Beaman underlines the
Court’s separation of belief and practice.141 However, the participant narratives explored here
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demonstrate that the primary communicative aim of the litigants and the intervening WSO was
that the kirpan not be categorized as a weapon. Given that the Court of Appeal treated the kirpan
as a weapon, it is important to recognize that the Supreme Court’s view was far from a foregone
conclusion when the matter was litigated. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s description of the
kirpan can be viewed as a significant moment in cross-cultural communication.

5.3. Wilson Colony
In Wilson Colony, a group of Hutterian Brethren challenged a provincial regulation that made
driver’s licence photos universally mandatory. For some 27 years the province had maintained a
religious exemption to this requirement. Some Hutterites, including the Wilson Colony members,
believe that the Biblical Second Commandment prohibiting graven images applies to all
imagery. On this basis, they refrain from taking photographs or being photographed. They had
long availed themselves of the religious exemption to photography. This allowed Colony
members to conduct all aspects of the colony’s agribusiness, an instantiation of their collectivist
worldview.

Of the three cases under review, Wilson Colony represents the most challenging instance of
cross-cultural communication. While Hutterite scriptures are likely familiar to many members of
the Canadian judiciary, their interpretative differences from mainstream Christianity set them
apart. Their religious worldview leads Colony members to live in purposeful isolation, and their
collectivist lifestyle is expressed in communal property ownership, 142 accomplished through the
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legal form of the corporation.143 Though land ownership was not at issue here, Hutterite
collectivism was, and was not given full respect by the majority of the Supreme Court. Before
addressing judicial responses, however, I examine the dialogue that occurred between the Wilson
Colony and the government of Alberta.
5.3.1. Adversarial Dialogues
A first challenge for the Wilson Colony’s counsel was to locate an appropriate source text.
This was literally a problem of translation, as the Hutterites use German language biblical texts
for prayer and study. It was crucial, according to counsel, to find an English version that
accurately reflected the content of the German text:
I’m not an expert in the Bible, but there are various versions and various
interpretations and that was a matter that required a fair amount of review and
ensuring… that I understood what their interpretation was and which edition… it was
that they followed. Of course they had the German one, but it is roughly translated
out by the King James version… the difference between the King James [version] of
the Second Commandment and some of the other versions… was fairly critical.144
The affidavits display efforts to explain the Colony’s religious beliefs and practices to the
courts. Notably, before dealing with the prohibition on photographs, one litigant’s affidavit
described the communal nature of the colony:
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I am a member in good standing of the Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, which
is a religious communal organization… Property, lands and chattels are held
collectively by the religious organization with individuals relinquishing the rights of
ownership in favour of the benefits of membership.145
In a later affidavit, the litigant explained further:
The failure or inability of any member to carry out their responsibilities causes our
religious commune to function improperly, thereby eroding the fabric of our social,
cultural and religious way of life. Although not every failure or inability to perform
results in a serious erosion of this fabric, the incremental damage to date resulting
from the position of the [Alberta government] is significant.146
The affidavit goes on to explain the economic and practical impacts of the universal photo policy
on the colony, claiming it would affect the operation of the colony’s agribusiness and ability to
drive members to medical appointments. In addition, one of the exhibits to the affidavit provides
a more detailed description of the religious import of communal living to the Hutterites:
the idea of love –brotherly togetherness and sharing… was at the very center of
Jacob Hutter’s [the founding figure of the group for whom it is named] work. He
visualized the brotherhood as a great family. Since in such a family all material
things are shared as a matter of fact, this should also be the case in a true
Gemeinschaft, or community… “Private property is the greatest enemy of Christian
Love.”147
The affidavit then explains the specific prohibition on photography with direct reference to
biblical text:
the Hutterian Brethren believe that Commandment No. 2 of The Ten Commandments
prohibits the capture of one’s image… [and] allowing their photographs to be taken
willingly… would be a sin. Commandment No. 2 states, “You shall not make for
yourself an idol, or any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or
in the water under the earth”, which the Hutterian Brethren interpret to include
photographs capturing their likeness.148
The litigant also noted that at one point some Colony members had photo driver’s licences,
an apparent inconsistency in the Wilson Colony’s religious practice. The litigant stated that he
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was “shocked to learn” of this.149 He explained that these members were to be punished in
accordance with the Colony’s traditions. In offering this explanation, the litigant integrates the
apparent inconsistency into a narrative of imperfect faith with themes of obligation, sin,
repentance, and punishment. Though the style of discipline may be unfamiliar to state actors, the
narrative helps to affirm the Wilson Colony’s particular interpretation of the Second
Commandment even in the face of facts that would seem to contradict it.150
In addition to framing Hutterite practices in these terms, the affidavit also relies on
authoritative state documents by making reference to the preamble of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which recognizes the supremacy of God.151 One might surmise that this
paragraph was drafted in conjunction with legal counsel. This leads to a claim more intelligible
to a state court, especially when contrasted with an earlier letter drafted by a group of Hutterites
that relied principally on biblical verses to construct an argument against the universal photo
requirement.152
Despite these efforts to make the Hutterite claim comprehensible, the transcript of the
cross-examination on this affidavit reveals several cross-cultural communication difficulties
between a Colony member and the Alberta government’s lawyer. The government’s counsel
began by drawing a distinction between participating in the creation of an image and having
images in one’s daily life.153 He then applied this distinction to the driver’s licence context:
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Would you agree with me that the images that we have to create at the Ministry of
Government Services to conduct our security process wouldn’t become part of your
daily life… and that … having a license with your photo on it… would not contradict
that aspect of your concerns about idolatry and images?154
The Hutterite witness resisted these analytical categories, saying: “if you contradict one
Commandment you are trespassing the rest of the Commandments.”155 Counsel pursued the
notion further, and was met by the same resistance:
Q: … it seems to me… you have more than one concern with images. One part of
your concern is participating in their creation and another part of your concern is
having it direct your mind possibly to value things other than God. And I thought that
those – there was a reasonable distinction to be drawn between those two things. Fair
enough?...
A: No.
…
We do not believe in pictures and there’s no use arguing over trying to find an
alternative if there is an image or a picture involved.156
The reason that counsel pushed on with this distinction was to lay the foundation for an
argument that the government had done its best to accommodate the Wilson Colony members.
By separating out two aspects of Hutterite belief, the government could claim that it met the
Wilson Colony halfway by taking one aspect of the belief into account. The problem is that the
analytical breakdown of the religious belief was put forward by the government’s counsel and
never accepted by the religious adherents. Indeed, the distinction seemed unintelligible to the
litigant. When counsel asked whether it was fair to characterize the government’s proposal as
meeting “some of your concerns but… nonetheless, insufficient,” the litigant simply did not
understand, replying: “Can I beg your pardon on that? I quite don’t follow you there.”157
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In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the Albertan government did
demonstrate an understanding of the Hutterite objection to being photographed:
[The photo requirement] is inconsistent with a certain branch of Hutterian beliefs,
certainly Wilson Colony’s, the respondents’, who believe that the making of the
image involves them in the creation of graven image, contrary to the Second
Commandment.158
At other points in the argument, counsel attempted to discredit the evidence of the Wilson
Colony members, who claimed that having driver’s licences was essential for their community’s
survival. Counsel analogized the Wilson Colony Hutterites to Amish communities, overstating
the similarities between the two Anabaptist groups:
their evidence is, although we discount it, that having drivers’ licences is essentially
for the continued existence of their agricultural communal communities… [W]e
believe that the consequence of requiring a driver’s licence would be that the
respondents would, as others would, prioritize their travel and hire someone to drive
them, much as Amish do.159
As discussed below, this prediction turned out to be erroneous, arguably in part because it failed
to appreciate the internal diversity of Anabaptist practice.

When counsel for the Wilson Colony appeared at the Supreme Court, he spent nearly the
entirety of his oral argument engaged in a fairly semantic exchange with members of the Court
regarding the nature of reasonable accommodation and the application of s. 1 of the Charter (the
“reasonable limits” provision).160 This is attributable, in large measure, to the fact that the
infringement of religious freedom was conceded by the Alberta government. But it also
highlights the degree to which the terms of discussion are set by concepts embedded in the
state’s legal culture.
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Indeed, counsel for the Wilson Colony also spent a significant portion of their written
submissions pursuing the argument that fundamental freedoms should not be infringed without
debate in the legislature. In this view, the abolition of the religious exemption to the driver’s
licence photo requirement was invalid because the executive implemented it by regulation
without legislative debate.161 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. That counsel would
spend so much time on this point when their clients find engagement in the democratic process
problematic (for example, they do not vote)162 suggests that counsel felt compelled to pursue an
argument that would have made little sense to their clients.163
Interestingly, counsel for two of the intervener organizations—the Evangelical Fellowship
of Canada and the Christian Legal Fellowship164—opened a line of dialogue calling into question
the Court’s individualist approach to religion. Counsel asked “the court to recognize that there is
a communal component of the freedom of religion; that the freedom of religion in large part
manifested as a group or part of a group.”165 Such a discussion centres on a value-based
difference that has implications for the legal form accorded to the norm of religious freedom.
While the constitutional culture and the religious cultures represented in the Wilson Colony
litigation agreed that religious freedom was an important norm, the precise legal form of that
norm depends crucially on the values that underlie it. In the Supreme Court’s articulation, those
values share liberalism’s concern for the individual; counsel for the interveners sought to
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introduce the value of community into this discussion. Notably, in an attempt to bridge the
cultural divide, counsel for the intervener organizations grounded this argument in constitutional
provisions and previous statements of the Supreme Court rather than in a religious text or
artefact.

5.3.2. Judicial Responses
The Court of Queen’s Bench was attentive to the Wilson Colony’s concern with being
photographed. Justice Lovecchio noted two accommodations proposed by the province. The first
was that photos would continue to be taken, stored in the electronic database, and included on a
driver’s licence, but the licence would be issued in an enclosure identifying it as the property of
the Province of Alberta which would only need to be offered to a peace officer as necessary. The
second proposal was that the photo be taken and stored in the electronic database, but not
included on the individual’s licence.166 Justice Lovecchio was not impressed with these
proposals, as “under either accommodation, members of the applicant colony who wish to drive
will have to submit to having their photograph taken which is precisely their problem.”167 At the
same time, however, he offered only an abbreviated discussion in his decision of the Hutterites’
communalism.168 Perhaps the Court felt it did not need to engage in this kind of discussion in
order to grant the Wilson Colony the remedy it sought.
In addition, showing self-awareness, the Court of Queen’s Bench was sceptical of the
government’s description of the legislation’s objective. Of course, courts frequently adopt such a
posture, and being sceptical of a government argument is not equivalent to writing decisions that
demonstrate reflection on the law’s own prior assumptions. Still, it is notable that even though
166

Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v Alberta, 2006 ABQB 338 at paras 21-22.
Ibid at para 23.
168
Ibid at para 2.
167

50

both the courts and the Alberta legislature speak the language of the state, the court thought it
important to scrutinize the government’s claims. This adds a gloss on Berger’s insight that courts
and litigants do not participate as equals in cross-cultural encounters. Judicial review serves as a
balancing mechanism, albeit an imperfect one. To some extent, judges can serve to decrease the
likelihood that cross-cultural encounters between citizens and the state will take the forms of
conversion or assimilation.
The majority of the Court of Appeal followed the Court of Queen’s Bench in recognizing
Hutterite religious beliefs and practices, and was similarly sceptical of the government’s stated
objectives. The majority also engaged more deeply with the communalist worldview of the
Wilson Colony, showing sensitivity to the intertwined practical and religious consequences that a
photo requirement would have on this aspect of the Colony’s way of life:
although the colonies attempt to be self-sufficient, certain members must drive
regularly on Alberta highways…
Given their communal way of life, the inability to drive would… have enumerable
and severe practical consequences for each individual in the respondents’
community… the very existence of the community depends on each individual
carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him or her.169
In contrast, Justice Slatter’s dissenting judgment at the Court of Appeal was less sceptical
of the government’s position, pointing out that its evidence on identity fraud was
uncontradicted.170 Moreover, Justice Slatter supported his decision by referring to other
jurisdictions where photos are required on driver’s licences and no exemption exists.171 In this
way, Justice Slatter’s opinion took comfort in views from the legal cultures of other liberal states
which are likely congruent in a broad sense with the court’s own cultural background. The
dissenting judgment’s largest failure of cross-cultural communication, however, is the manner of
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its engagement with the Hutterite religious beliefs and practices. In support of the conclusion that
the accommodation offered by the government was reasonable, Justice Slatter offered his own
interpretation of the biblical texts submitted by the Wilson Colony.
The central prohibition of the second commandment is the creation of idols… The
proposed accommodations would preclude the respondents ever having to look at
their photographs themselves. While obviously not ideal from the perspective of the
respondents, the accommodations proposed by the appellant do have the effect of
significantly minimizing the impact of the regulations on the respondents’
observance of the second commandment.172
Though Justice Slatter purported to deal with the religious obligation “on its own terms,”173 his
analysis reveals that he actually approached it on the government’s terms, disconnecting the
biblical text from the Wilson Colony’s interpretive tradition.
At the Supreme Court, the majority recognized both the photo-related and communal
living aspects of Hutterite religious practices. However, the effects of the photo requirement on
Hutterite communalism were not considered as an infringement of religious freedom, but as a
factor to take into account in the proportionality analysis.174 In this way, the majority failed to
fully understand and respect the religious dimensions of the Wilson Colony’s communalism.
This demonstrates that the Wilson Colony’s loss at the Supreme Court was about
miscommunication in addition to disagreement. Perhaps in part because of this communicative
failure, the majority did not properly anticipate the colony’s reaction to its ruling. The majority
opined that the costs on the Colony would be financial: hiring non-members to perform the
necessary driving tasks for the colony.175 However, instead of contracting out driving services,
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some colony members decided to compromise their religious beliefs and have their photos taken,
while others chose to accept the penalties associated with driving with expired licences.176
Perhaps more worrisome for future cases is that the majority decision in Wilson Colony
sets up a legal scenario where governments can refuse accommodation sought by a minority
religious group if the accommodation would not allow the government to completely reach its
objective.177 This may discourage dialogue between governments and religious groups. Under
this approach, when it comes to legislation, the government can simply articulate its purpose and
expect that, so long as the objective is legitimate, it will not need to compromise. There may be
political reasons for compromise, but this prospect is cold comfort for minority populations with
little political clout. In contrast, Justice LeBel’s dissenting opinion held that courts should have
more leeway “in determining how far the goal ought to be attained in order to achieve the proper
balance between the objective of the state and the rights at stake.”178 This framework is more
likely to encourage dialogue between governments and minority religious groups as legislatures
will expect judicial review to involve more scrutiny.

5.3.3. Litigant Reflections
The litigants interviewed attributed their loss at the Supreme Court to a failure of
communication. One litigant explained:
we figured we could explain everything to our lawyer, and [he] explained everything
to the judge in Ottawa, but it seems like they didn’t really quite understand the way
of life. And that’s why they made that decision.179
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The same litigant also framed the communication breakdown as a failure to recognize the
colony’s difference: “they figured we have to obey the law, like all other people do.”180 In this
perspective, to be treated “just like everyone else” represents a failure to take into account the
Hutterites’ religious and cultural needs.181 In an alternative formulation provided by another
litigant: “it seems like we’re a nobody.”182 In other words, non-recognition of the Wilson
Colony’s particular attributes felt to the litigant as if he wasn’t recognized as a full person.
At another point in the interview, a litigant explained that he was glad to speak with
journalists in order to explain his religion: “Any time we can explain our religion… we would
gladly do that.”183 In other words, though the Wilson Colony members prefer an isolated life in
many respects, they are pleased to engage with non-Hutterites in order to make their particular
perspective more widely understood. Significantly, though, this does not mean that Wilson
Colony members are open to back-and-forth with other cultures. Indeed, participants noted
restrictions they observe to keep their members away from the influence of popular culture;
televisions, radios, and Internet access, for example, are forbidden on the Colony.184
Finally, one litigant also described some ongoing efforts to negotiate a photo exemption
directly with the government. Similarly to his explanation of the Supreme Court’s decision, he
attributed the failure to negotiate an exemption as a communication problem:
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We have written numerous letters to our MLAs, we had a couple of meetings with
the Minister of Government Services, we had a phone call with Premier Ed
Stelmach, and I wrote him a couple letters, but seems like everything falls on deaf
ears, they keep writing us back that… the Supreme Court ruled that you have to have
a photo on your driver’s licence, and there’s no other way out.185
For government officials, the Supreme Court’s decision signalled an end to the discussion. From
this litigant’s perspective, however, the decision was neither final nor properly binding. At the
time of the interview, the litigant explained that his community would not alter its practices:
“we’re not gonna take a photo.”186
Moreover, the litigant was still hopeful for a change in policy. Alberta was set to have a new
premier as the governing Progressive Conservative party was in the midst of a new leadership
contest: “right now we’re waiting for a new premier in the province of Alberta… so maybe we
can talk some sense into him.”187 To my knowledge, no new agreement has been reached since
Alberta’s current premier, Alison Redford, took office in October 2011.
6. Conclusions
Participant narratives recurrently raised the theme of cross-cultural communication. This
theme was also prominent in the litigation documents. In all the cases under review, litigants
sought to explain a norm of religious practice by reference to the background justifications and
values that underpinned them. In Amselem, those who sought the right to build their own succoth
situated the practice against the background justification of a system of biblical commandments
that orient their lives. The values offered to make sense of the practice included anti-materialism
and humility before a supreme being. The claimants addressed the dispute between the parties
about the nature of the practice – whether one was obliged to build a succah on one’s own
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balcony – with reference to the value of maintaining a joyous atmosphere around the holiday. In
Multani, the claimants presented the kirpan practice as congruent with values adopted by
Canadian constitutional culture: resistance to oppression, defending the defenseless, and the
protection of minorities. More general values associated with Sikhism – sexual equality and
cultural integration – were also drawn on to situate and familiarize the kirpan. In Wilson Colony,
the practice of avoiding photographs and imagery was explained in reference to a shared cultural
artefact – the Ten Commandments – but also with reference to the value of anti-idolatry and the
background justification of obedience to God. The Colony members also sought to connect this
practice to the value of communalism that orients their daily lives.
In addition to dialogues about specific religious practices, all three cases involved dialogues
around the norm of religious freedom. In Amselem, the litigants put forward an expert witness to
emphasize the obligatory nature of their succah practice and insisted on the inappropriateness of
state courts ruling on matters of religious doctrine. The former was aimed at bringing the practice
within the ambit of religious freedom, and the latter at appealing to notions of the separation of
religion and state to give content to the norm of religious freedom. In Multani, the litigants were
concerned more specifically with the norm of reasonableness as it applies to religious freedom
and sought to paint the kirpan’s exclusion as unreasonable in light of the other potentially
dangerous objects routinely allowed into public schools. In Wilson Colony, the primary thrust of
the Colony’s argument was to minimize the potential benefit of a universal licence requirement,
playing out their claim according to the value of cost-benefit analysis. However, by emphasizing
the collective aspects of their practice, the claimants displayed a value-based difference with the
prevailing Canadian jurisprudence of religious freedom.
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With respect to the Supreme Court of Canada’s responses to these efforts at cross-cultural
communication, the majority decision in Wilson Colony represents a low point of cross-cultural
communication. There, the majority failed to properly appreciate the centrality of collectivism to
the religious life of the Hutterite community. This can be seen as both a failure of respect for the
litigants and a failure of self-awareness regarding Canadian law’s normative commitments to
individualism. The Court’s decision in Multani stands out as a success by refusing to paint the
kirpan as a weapon, treating it instead as a religious object. This was a central concern of the
litigants and the intervening World Sikh Organization, and both were gratified by the Court’s
reasons in this regard. In my view, this success is explained in large measure by the way the
litigants emphasized the affinity in values between Sikh and Canadian constitutional cultures. It
was also the case in which the Supreme Court demonstrated the highest degree of selfawareness, taking seriously the comparison between the kirpan and other potentially dangerous
objects that are accepted in schools. The Amselem case represents something of a middle ground.
While the Court showed a good understanding of the significance of the succah practice in the
litigants’ lives, it adopted a highly individualistic view of religion that may fail to capture the
communal aspects of some religious practices. In sum, the three cases under review show the
courts’ potential to be both successful and unsuccessful at cross-cultural communication. Though
courts and counsel tended to present their views as culturally neutral, they also demonstrated the
capacity for both self-awareness and respect leading to a greater understanding of minority
practices and a greater sense on the part of participants that the courts recognized their identities.

It is striking in this study that the litigants who felt the courts understood them were also
the litigants who were successful in the final result. It is likely that the ultimate result in the cases
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coloured litigants’ perceptions of their experiences. I do not mean to suggest here that successful
cross-cultural communication will always lead to religious freedom claimants obtaining their
desired outcome from the courts. The Multani court may have come to a different if, for
example, there was persuasive evidence about the kirpan’s dangerousness in comparison to other
sharp objects. The Wilson Colony court could have arrived at the same result while giving
stronger recognition to the collective aspects of Hutterite religious experience. This may have
left the claimants feeling they had been misunderstood, but not due to a failure of
communication. The values of cross-cultural communication do not require agreement but rather
on maintaining respect and humility in attempting to understand one another.
This being said, there is good reason to believe that this better cross-cultural
communication leads to better decision-making. An incomplete understanding of the practice
necessarily means an incomplete analysis of the impact of a particular policy on religious
freedom. In Amselem, such a complete understanding may have been unnecessary because of the
weakness of the other co-owners’ interests. Multani and Wilson Colony, however, show the
impact of cross-cultural communication on proportionality analyses. The Multani Court was able
to appreciate the costs of not wearing a kirpan to baptized Sikhs, and thus was able to place the
school’s arguments in proper perspective. The majority of the Wilson Colony Court, on the other
hand, was unable to appreciate the full effects of enforcing a universal photo requirement on
driver’s licences, in part because it failed to bridge the difference between individualist and
collectivist understandings of religious obligation. In contrast, the dissenting judges in Wilson
Colony showed a deeper appreciation of the Hutterites’ collectivist worldview.188 This suggests
that the values of cross-cultural communication may not require a change in the law, but rather
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vigilance on the part of judges to maintain respect and self-awareness when interpreting evidence
about religious practices.
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